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Summary. The article discusses the origin and development of the rent-
seeking theory. The interim results of the rent-seeking theory are summarized. 
The main trends in the rent-seeking theory development are presented in modern 
conditions. 
 
Widespread rent-seeking in many socio-economic systems of virtually all 
countries has caused increased academics attention to agents‟ rent-seeking 
behavior in different spheres of society. Problems associated with rent-seeking 
are relevant for major semi-peripheral (China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, etc.) 
especially. These countries are still not among the economically advanced states, 
and there is actual a “vicious circle of inefficient economic systems” for 
“developing countries” category according to a number of researchers. Rent-
seeking is an important link in this “vicious circle”[6].  
Initially rent-seeking theory began to develop in the framework of the 
“Virginia School of Public Choice”, whose members regularly publish their 
works in the pages of “Public Choice” science magazine. The term “rent-
seeking” was introduced in the scientific dictionary in the framework of this 
school, in fact [7]. “Rent-seeking activity” and “rent-seeking behavior” both are 
treated as synonyms. In addition, Virginia School achievements should include 
the “political economy of rent-seeking society” creation, integration of rent-
seeking theory and property rights theory [17], the basic rent-seeking model 
developing [8, 10, 16], political agents‟ rent-seeking models creation in the 
political business cycle context [1, 5, 9]. 
Rent-seeking is defined as a negative in its consequences for the public 
welfare traditionally, in accordance with the rent-seeking theory “mainstream”, 
as part of the (often very large) resources rent-seeking agents are not directed to 
the goods output growth and distracted by the institutional conditions creation for 
reallocation of already created value in favor of the respective agent. This is 
evidenced by rent-seeking interpretation formulated by many researchers (see 
Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Treats of “rent-seeking”  
 
The authors Treats 
G. Tullock 
“The term rent seeking is designed to describe behaviour in institutional 
settings where individual efforts to maximize value generate social 
waste rather than social surplus” [14] 
R. Tollison 
Rent-seeking is “the expenditure of scarce resources to capture an 
artificially created transfer” [13, p. 578] 
G. Anderson, Ch. 
Rowley, R. Tollison  
Rent-seeking is “the pursuit of profits via the use of government 
coercion” [2, p. 100] 
M. Brooks,  
B. Heijdra,  
A. Lowenberg 
Rent seeking is “the use of resources to challenge existing property 
rights” [3, p. 432] 
Ch. Rowley 
“Rent-seeking focuses attention on the resources expended by 
competing interest groups in order to persuade governments to provide 
returns higher than they could earn in the absence of government 
protection” [11, p. 141] 
P. Fischer 
“In its most general form, rent-seeking describes the use of resources to 
capture a „transfer‟ rather than to directly produce a good or service” [4, 
p. 2] 
P. Fischer 
“Rent-seeking is an activity, usually implying the expenditure of scarce 
resources, to cause and capture artificially-created (and usually 
politically contestable) rents as well as transfers which are not part of 
society‟s intended income redistribution” [4, p. 34] 
 
Thus, dominating characteristics of rent-seeking behavior are the following 
in the tradition of the public choice school: a) the negative impaction to the social 
welfare; 2) the welfare redistribution area. Therefore, rent-seeking is defined as 
the attempt of individuals or groups to increase their own welfare, while making 
a negative contribution to the net society welfare. It means that some resources 
will not be consumed for productive purposes, but to the property rights structure 
change to favor of individuals or groups to obtain them in the form of surplus 
rents.  
There are the distinctive characteristics rent-seeking in the scientific 
literature (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Distinguishing features of rent-seeking and profit-seeking* 
 
Type of activity Inputs Outputs Net effect  
Profit-seeking 
Production costs of 
labor, land, capital 
The final output of 
goods and services 
Net value added (final 
product gross value minus 
production costs) 
Rent-seeking Rent-seeking costs 
Economic rights as 
the “rental results” 
Net rent-seeking effect (net 
social gains minus rent-
seeking costs) 
* Compiled by: [6, p. 3]  
 
We should consider only the net social gain, which is formed as the agents 
rent-seeking activity result, during determining the net rent-seeking effect. 
Modern authors decipher rent-seeking costs as expenses in the process: a) 
lobbying; b) political activities; c) bribery and other “influencing effects”. Rental 
results are the acquired, conserved, disturbed economic rights which were 
converted to the rents creation. Redistributed licenses, granting monopoly rights, 
subsidies, arising property rights are given as examples of the “rental results” 
usually [6]. 
The traditional interpretation of rent-seeking suggests that as a result of the 
economic agents rent-seeking society incurs losses of two types: losses due to 
inefficient administration of property rights and the production volume reduction 
due to waste of resources to obtain rents. These costs are higher than the amount 
of possible rent often. Thus, the direct losses due to agents‟ rent-seeking strategy 
measured value terms the overhead of creating the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the redistribution of national income in the rental income form. 
Social losses due to rent-seeking illustrated by “Tullock rectangle” usually (see 
Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Redistribution of wealth as a result of market monopolization 
 
The horizontal axis shows the quantity of goods, the vertical axis shows its 
price. Equilibrium price P1 will be realized amount Q1 of goods in the context of 
perfectly competitive market. In a monopoly context price rises to a value of P2, 
and the volume of its implementation is reduced to a value of Q2. Rectangle 
shows P1P2AC monopoly profits, i.e. value redistribution from consumers to the 
monopolist. In traditional economic theory the net society losses due to markets 
monopolizing are absent, because there is a simple reallocation from some 
society members (consumers) to the other society members (monopolies). 
American scientist Gordon Tullock and his followers proved incorrect this 
judgment. The fact that economic agents tend to expend resources to create 
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monopoly position in the market. Thus in the successful case they spend at least a 
part of the resources corresponding to the rectangle area P1P2AC, but they may 
use these tools and even amount exceeding the area of the rectangle. 
There may be competition between economic agents for a monopoly 
position achieving in the market. Losers also expend resources during rent-
seeking instead to invest in the goods production. Consequently, they have 
expended funds, which are redistributed to the competition winners, and the 
society as a whole has nothing to gain from their rent-seeking. In addition, the 
rent-seeking behavior is often accompanied by resistance to it. Also there is a 
resources waste in this case. 
Rent-seeking is not limited by actions aimed to achieve a monopoly 
position in the market. Rent seeking occurs also in the cases of establishing 
maximum or minimum goods prices, during the foreign trade restriction, tax 
system change, etc. There is property rights redistribution bringing benefits to 
certain economic agents in these cases.  
 
Table 3. Estimates of losses due to rent-seeking 
 
Experts 
The object of 
research 
Institutional conditions  
of rent-seeking  
Losses due to 
rent-seeking 
А. Krueger 
Economy of India 
in 1964 
Import licenses (quantitative control 
over foreign trade) 
7,3% national 
income 
А. Krueger 
Economy of Turkey 
in 1968 
Import licenses (quantitative control 
over foreign trade) 
15% GNP 
S. Mohammad, 
J. Whalley 
Economy of India 
in 1980-81 
The establishment of import and 
export licenses, control of labor 
markets, capital markets and goods 
markets 
35-40% GNP 
S. Mohammad, 
J. Whalley 
Economy of Ghana 
in 1981 
The establishment of import and 
export licenses, control of labor 
markets, capital markets and goods 
markets 
18-21% GDP 
S. Mohammad, 
J. Whalley 
Economy of Ghana 
in 1984 
The establishment of import and 
export licenses, control of labor 
markets, capital markets and goods 
markets 
22-25% GDP 
К. Koling, 
D. Mueller 
Corporate sector in 
the USA in 1963-66 
Private corporations rent-seeking 
13% «gross 
corporative 
product» 
К. Koling, 
D. Mueller 
Corporate sector in 
the UK in 1968-69 
Private corporations rent-seeking 
7% «gross 
corporative 
product» 
Р. Posner 
6 sectors of the US 
economy 
(agriculture, 
communications, 
energy, banking, 
insurance, 
medicine, transport) 
State regulation (overstatement) of 
prices 
≈ 17% 
production 
output 
 Attempts to economic losses identify due to rent-seeking undertaken by 
many scientists during the last third of the twentieth century. These losses were 
calculated both for the national economies of developing countries (India, 
Turkey, Ghana), and at the level of individual sectors and industry groups such 
highly developed countries like the USA and the UK (see Table 3). 
There is criticism increasing of Virginia school, primarily affecting 
“Tullock rectangle” already in the 1980s. Critics have overestimated the loss of 
social welfare. First, it seems unlikely that rent-seekers use the whole “Tullock 
rectangle” to achieve monopoly status in the market. Secondly, the rent-seeking 
costs can have positive influence to welfare. The restrictions introduced in the 
models of rent-seeking lead to incorrect conclusions also, so the data models can 
not serve as the theoretical basis of the economic policy implementation [12, 15]. 
However, this criticism does not extend beyond the “mainstream” theory of rent-
seeking.  
Analysis of scientific publications over the past 25 years allows us to 
determine the current trends of development of the rent-seeking theory. 
1. There is a specification of the category rent-seeking: it makes sense to 
distinguish between the rent-seeking behavior and rent-seeking activity. Thus, the 
development of the rent-seeking theory has the binary object of study.  
2. Rent-seeking is investigated in the context of resource flows between 
such subjects “patron-client” network interactions as the bureaucracy, 
“capitalists”, politicians, ordinary voters (Non-Capitalist Clients).  
3. In order to approach the real models of national socio-economic systems 
it makes sense to research the rent-seeking in the coordinate system opening area 
of the spatial economy for the theory of rent-seeking behavior. 
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